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PRIVACY  AND  MARKETS:  A  LOVE  STORY
Ryan Calo*
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a former congressional staffer by the name of Matthew Colbert
developed a software application he called “BuyPartisan.”1  The app invites
consumers with smart phones to scan the barcodes of just about any product
and learn the political leanings of the company that sells it.  The display con-
sists of a meter displaying blue or red, depending on the campaign contribu-
tions of the company’s leadership.  “Wouldn’t it be great,” Colbert asks, “if
you could spend how you believed?”2
Occasionally market participants depart from the traditional market cri-
teria of price and quality.  A conscientious consumer might strongly prefer
her coffee to be “free trade” or a diamond to be “conflict free.”  A certain
kind of religious flower shop owner might refuse on moral grounds to pro-
vide flowers to a wedding with two grooms.3  Economists would chalk these
departures up to “exogenous preference”—attributes that the market can
take into account.
© 2016 Ryan Calo.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Professor of Information Science (by
courtesy), University of Washington.  Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Law School Center for
Internet and Society and Yale Law School Information Society Project.  This draft
benefited from comment at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference at the U.C. Berkeley
School of Law and the U.C. Hastings School of Law faculty colloquium.  Thank you to Meg
Young and the Gallagher Law Library for excellent research assistance.
1 BuyPartisan: Voting with Your Wallet, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/united-states/21616976-app-brings-partisan-rage-grocery-store-
voting-your-wallet.
2 Colby Itkowitz, Is Your Grocery Bill Supporting Your Political Opponents? Now You Can
Avoid It, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/
wp/2014/08/12/is-your-grocery-bill-supporting-your-political-opponents-heres-how-to-
avoid-it/.
3 E.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213, at *30
(Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (finding against flower shop for discriminating against
gay couple in contravention of Washington law).  What this example shows, of course, is
that one person’s ethical consumption can be another’s discrimination. See also infra Sec-
tion IV.B.
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But imagine if consumers and businesses knew everything.  Not just the
circumstances under which a product was made or the politics of its seller,
but whether each other market participant supports a rival sports team,
believes in God, or bakes erotic cakes on the weekend.  In other words, imag-
ine a marketplace without privacy.  Would such a marketplace be desirable?
Would it be efficient?  Would the market mechanism work at all if price and
quality took a backseat to salient but arguably extraneous information about
market participants?
This Article examines the complex relationship between privacy and
markets.  In so doing, it rejects both law and economics’ skepticism toward
privacy and the hostility many privacy law scholars have toward markets.  The
thesis of this Article is that privacy and markets are in important ways sympa-
thetic.  To paraphrase contract theorist Charles Fried, it is not that privacy
will help markets work better, but that the market mechanism quietly
assumes and relies upon privacy to work in the first place.4  And the reverse is
true as well.
Privacy supports the basic market mechanism by hiding enough distract-
ing, value-laden information from market participants.  A certain absence of
knowledge focuses us on market-relevant considerations such as quality and
price over salient but distorting information such as personal or political
commitments.  The beauty of the market mechanism is that you do not need
to know that the person you are dealing with voted for a politician you hate
or doubts we landed on the moon, or for any other basis for distrust or dis-
crimination, only that he is offering the best quality good at the lowest price.
Privacy also enables the longevity of business partnerships through the
facilitation of economic intimacy.  Market relationships face an ever-present
specter of defection—the prospect of a better deal somewhere else—which
participants manage in part through the selective disclosure of preferences
and expectations without penalty.  In business, as in life, privacy helps you let
the right one in, and in the process engenders the trust necessary for eco-
nomic stability.5
Finally, privacy helps keep a check on information asymmetry between
people and firms.  While economists agree that information asymmetry is
undesirable, the standard remedy is to introduce additional information—for
instance, through mandatory disclosure laws.6  But today’s firms are increas-
ingly more capable than consumers of processing new information, such that
4 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968) (“[M]y thesis that privacy is not
just one possible means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily
related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and
trust.”).
5 For an argument about the role of contracts generally in moral cooperation, see
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
6 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2012).  On the failure of mandated disclosure to accomplish its goals,
see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647 (2011).
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introducing more information only exacerbates asymmetry and its discon-
tents.  Privacy can interrupt this dynamic and help save the market from
itself.
These arguments build the case for protecting privacy in the market con-
text, including through the force of law.  It is important to note, however,
that privacy assumes and relies upon markets as well.  Privacy is best under-
stood as an instrument of human flourishing.7  To flourish, people need the
separation from others that privacy affords.  But they also need access to the
material and cultural resources that only other people in society can provide.
Self-actualization is the province of the clothed and the fed; regardless, it
cannot happen in a vacuum.  Markets help us to help one another, a proposi-
tion too little remarked in privacy scholarship.
More fundamentally, markets furnish the theoretical means by which to
distribute resources in society without having to know everything about every-
one.  Think just how much a government must know about its citizens truly
to enforce the famous socialist maxim, “From each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs!”8  From this perspective, privacy never had a
friend like markets.
The Article proceeds as follows.  After defining terms, Part I lays out the
law and economics case against privacy, including its basis in economic
thought more generally.  Part II canvasses the literature responding to eco-
nomic skepticism in the privacy law literature.  Some scholars mount an
insider critique, accepting the basic tenants of economics but suggesting that
privacy actually increases efficiency in some contexts, or else noting that mar-
kets themselves will yield privacy under the right conditions.  Others critique
economic thinking from the outside.  Markets “unravel” privacy by penalizing
it,9 degrade privacy by treating it as just another commodity,10 or otherwise
interfere with the values or processes that privacy exists to preserve.11
Part III tells the love story from the Article’s title.  I develop here a novel
account of the relationship between privacy and markets, positioning the two
concepts as sympathetic instead of antithetical.  Neither insider nor outsider,
the framework understands privacy as a crucial ingredient of the market
mechanism, while simultaneously demonstrating how markets enable privacy
to achieve its most important functions.  It turns out opposites attract, just as
Hollywood has been telling us all along.
7 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 (2013).
8 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in 3 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS:
SELECTED WORKS 13, 19 (1973).
9 Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).
10 Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 729–32 (1999); see also
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 988 (1964) (“Use of a photograph for trade purposes turns a man into
a commodity and makes him serve the economic needs and interest of others.”).
11 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 110–11 (2012).
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The final Part discusses what’s at stake.  First, at the descriptive level, this
Article sheds light on certain institutional puzzles such as why the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC” or “the Commission”)—an agency dedicated to
free markets and brimming with economists—would arise as the de facto pri-
vacy authority for the United States.12  The Article’s framework not only
explains and perhaps justifies the FTC’s role in policing privacy, but also
predicts other agencies such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
will increasingly become involved in privacy enforcement.
Second, at the level of discourse, the Article opens up new avenues of
analytic inquiry, previously obscured by a mutual skepticism.  In particular,
the framework helps surface the role of privacy in avoiding market discrimi-
nation for the simple reason that it hides many objects of potential bias.  And
third, normatively, this Article argues in support of laws and policies, such as
conditioning access to political databases on non-commercial use, that try to
keep personal information out of markets.
I. THE ECONOMIST’S CASE AGAINST PRIVACY
This Part canvases why law and economics tends to be skeptical of pri-
vacy, finding privacy overrated, inefficient, and perhaps even immoral.  The
short answer is that information is the presumed lifeblood of the market-
place, crucial to its proper and efficient functioning.  Privacy hides informa-
tion and in so doing compromises market optimization.  We’ll complicate
the matter in the next two Sections, but here I want to explain why the adher-
ents of economic theory—foremost among them, scholars in the tradition of
law and economics—look upon privacy with derision, if they do at all.
A. Terminology
Before laying out the case against privacy, a note about terminology: I
am going to be using some terms in this Article—privacy, markets, the mar-
ket mechanism—that do not necessarily have stable or agreed upon defini-
tions.13  The early literature seems to coalesce around the definition of
privacy as control over personal information.14  More recently, this conversa-
tion has pivoted toward defining privacy in terms of the control that holding
12 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Pri-
vacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585–86 (2014) (“FTC privacy jurisprudence has become the
broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United
States . . . .”).
13 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088–89
(2002) (discussing the amorphous nature of the term “privacy”).
14 E.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of indi-
viduals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others.”); Fried, supra note 4, at 483 (conceiv-
ing of privacy as “control over knowledge about oneself”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 281 (1977) (defining privacy in terms of control over infor-
mation); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 280–81 (1974)
(same).
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information about people affords over them.15  This Article uses the term
privacy largely in the negative, as shorthand for the opposite of data promis-
cuity.  Data promiscuity describes a situation, no doubt familiar to citizens of
the second millennium, in which information about people flows freely
between organizations and contexts.  Privacy, as this Article will use the term,
stands in as the force that interrupts the free flow of personal information.
Privacy here represents data chastity.
However you define privacy, the concept seems to invite an instrumental
justification.16  We protect privacy, when we do, because its absence would
undermine some activity, institution, or value society cares about.  Econo-
mists care about the efficient operation of markets.17  And while privacy can
be said to support efficiency in narrow circumstances, by and large economic
theory sees privacy as an impediment.  Perhaps as a consequence, little work
to date considers how markets themselves, as a concept, would fare in a world
without privacy.18  This Article takes up this question and answers that the
market mechanism assumes and relies upon privacy to accomplish its particu-
lar means of value exchange.
It bears mention at the outset that the market mechanism is not the
same thing as capitalism.  Hard to define in its own right, capitalism can be
thought of as a political system that commits economic and other elements of
society to private, profit-seeking individuals and firms over the state.19  The
market mechanism is essential to capitalism, of course, but distinct and far
simpler.  It represents a conceptual means of transferring property, promises,
rights, and so on between parties whereby individuals or groups openly
exchange goods and services for prices set by supply and demand.20  Com-
munist or socialist societies can and do have markets, if in fewer societal
contexts.
With few exceptions, I will refer to markets in this very basic sense.  I
purposefully select simple examples in order to investigate the interaction of
15 E.g., Symposium, Privacy and Technology, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013) (collecting
recent scholarship on the interplay between privacy and power).
16 As Ruth Gavison observes, we tend to think of privacy in terms of what it can do for
us as individuals and society.  Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,
441–42 (1980).  Indeed, on my account, privacy and markets each have ends that the other
facilitates.
17 For a discussion of this truism, see for example F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
18 As I discuss in Section III.A, some remark that markets might be less efficient without
privacy in some contexts.
19 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., GOOD CAPITALISM, BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS
OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 62 (2007) (canvassing various definitions but noting that
“[g]enerally, an economy is said to be capitalistic when most or at least a substantial pro-
portion of its means of production—its farms, its factories, its complex machinery—are in
private hands, rather than being owned and operated by the government”); see also Owen
M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 908, 908–09 (1992) (defining capital-
ism’s central institution as the market, with only a limited role for the state).
20 Cf. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 23–34 (5th ed.
2001) (defining market mechanism).
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privacy and the market mechanism at a conceptual level.  There are, of
course, a limitless variety of economic configurations, each of which have
subtle dynamics all their own.  Still, at their heart, these configurations tend
to share a reliance on the market mechanism to facilitate the exchange.
A final definitional problem cannot be entirely resolved here.  In the
Introduction and throughout this Article, I refer to information, like price
and quality, that is “traditionally” relevant to the market mechanism, and
contrast this to information that is irrelevant, “value-laden,” or “extrane-
ous.”21  This may strike economists as a false dichotomy, on the theory that
all information that informs preferences—literally anything that affects will-
ingness to buy or sell—is relevant to the market by definition.
Thus, my decision to label information other than what is strictly needed
to consummate a market transaction—i.e., the qualities of the service or
product on offer, the agreed upon price, and perhaps reputational informa-
tion about the market participant—as extraneous may be sneaking in
assumptions and commitments.  At the same time, the move makes clear
intuitive sense; it should not strike the reader as necessarily controversial that
the market represents a particular sphere of life.  You see this in the many
rules and norms that apply to the market but not elsewhere.22  Ultimately,
my point will be that too severe a departure from factors such as price and
quality that characterize market activity in favor of highly salient, value-laden
information is problematic.
B. Economists Are Skeptical of Privacy
My appreciation of this different view arose when I was in government, discussing
privacy with people from many intellectual and political backgrounds.  In these conver-
sations, I came to believe that there was one important predictor of people who did not
“get” the privacy issue.  That predictor was having received graduate training in
economics.23
  Economists long dream of a market with perfect information.24  Few think
of such a world as literally possible and cotemporary market theory addresses
21 See, e.g., infra subsection III.A.1; infra Section IV.C.
22 Experiments by Dan Ariely and colleagues are instructive.  The researchers shift
between the social and market context by characterizing tasks as favors instead of jobs and
observe marked changes in behavior. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN
FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 75 (2010) (discussing “why we are happy to do things,
but not when we are paid to do them”).
23 Peter P. Swire, Efficient Confidentiality for Privacy, Security, and Confidential Business
Information, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 2003, at 273, 278–79
(emphasis added).
24 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. ACM 92, 97 (1996) (“In a per-
fect world characterized by perfect information . . . shared by all, capital and labor are
combined at their most socially efficient levels to produce the wealth of nations.  In this
most felicitous world of 19th-century economic thought, symmetry of information among
market participants—capitalists, laborers, and consumers—is the lubricant of social and
economic progress.”).
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itself to the reality of partial, asymmetrically distributed information.25  Nev-
ertheless, more information is considered better than less.  In George
Akerlof’s famous The Market for “Lemons”, the missing information has to do
with the quality of a good (used cars).26  But market participants need many
other categories of information as well, from a competitor’s price, to a ven-
dor’s reputation, to the skills and work habits of a prospective employee.
The market works best when everyone acts rationally on the best
information.
The perfect information ideal leaves economists working in a number of
modes with a distaste for privacy insofar as privacy reduces information avail-
able to market participants.  The best-known skeptics write in the tradition of
law and economics.  Judge Richard Posner in particular argues across various
writings that privacy is not the societal value most believe.27  In a passage that
reads like a paraphrase of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, Judge Posner
refers to solitude as economically “selfish” because it only benefits the person
experiencing it.28  But more generally, he positions privacy as a means for
market actors to take advantage of others by selectively hiding germane infor-
mation.  Thus, for instance, the convict uses privacy as a way to shield his
transgressive history from a potential employer.  For Judge Posner, the value
of privacy, in the sense of “concealment of information about [oneself] that
others might use to their [advantage],” must be weighed against the eco-
nomic value of “obtaining the right amount of information in a free-market
system.”29
Judge Posner is especially visible but hardly alone.  Nearly every law-and-
economics scholar to approach privacy has come away skeptical.  In 1980, the
Journal of Legal Studies published by the University of Chicago devoted an
entire symposium issue to the law and economics of privacy with a variety of
contributors.30  Privacy did not fare well.  “In grossly oversimplified terms,”
summarizes Richard Murphy, “the consensus of the law and economics litera-
25 Id.
26 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
27 E.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1979)
[hereinafter Posner, Secrecy]; Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
405 (1981); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978) [hereinafter
Posner, Right of Privacy].
28 Compare Posner, Secrecy, supra note 27, at 8 (“As a detail, it may be noted that if there
is a taste for solitude as an end in itself it is a selfish emotion in a precise economic sense
that can be assigned to the concept of selfishness.  Solitary activity (or cessation of activity)
benefits only the actor.”), with ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 214 (1932) (“‘I’m not
surprised,’ said Bernard.  ‘It’s flatly against all their sleep-teaching.  Remember, they’ve
had at least a quarter of a million warnings against solitude.’”).
29 Posner, Secrecy, supra note 27, at 5, 9.  Judge Posner candidly refers to this activity as
“prying.” Id. at 23–24.
30 Symposium, The Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980).  Contrib-
utors include Richard A. Posner, George J. Stigler, Jack Hirshleifer, Edmund W. Kitch,
Anthony T. Kronman, Kenneth E. Scott, Gary S. Becker, and John P. Gould. Id.
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ture is this: more information is better, and restrictions on the flow of infor-
mation in the name of privacy are generally not social wealth maximizing,
because they inhibit decisionmaking, increase transactions costs, and
encourage fraud.”31
Contemporary law and policy debates about privacy also reflect a con-
cern over the economic impact of limits on consumer information flows
under the rubric of innovation policy.32  Privacy regulations could form a
barrier to market entry or otherwise harm competition.33  Firms will not be
able to generate new, useful content or services without the largely unfet-
tered ability to collect, process, and disseminate information.  And while the
position begins to weaken in light of consumer and regulatory concerns, ref-
erences to the economic policy of innovation appear at the top of nearly
every government report on privacy and technology I have ever come
across.34
The views of economically minded law and policy scholars echo those of
economists generally.  In his essay Markets and Privacy, Kenneth Laudon
assembles examples of skepticism toward privacy in economic literature span-
ning decades.35  For many agency theorists, for instance, i.e., economists
interested in the market for managerial labor, “privacy—or any restriction on
information flow by agents—is a costly extravagance raising the costs of man-
31 Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Pri-
vacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2382 (1996).
32 E.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to
New Technology, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1994) (arguing for unrestricted access to genetic
databases); Adam Thierer, Privacy Law’s Precautionary Principle Problem, 66 ME. L. REV. 467,
468 (2014) (placing privacy “on a collision course with the general freedom to innovate
that has thus far powered the Internet revolution”); see also Cohen, supra note 7, at 1919
(“In debates about information privacy, innovation is increasingly positioned as a justifica-
tion for withholding data protection, and for looking the other way when privacy breaches
appear to violate existing promises to consumers and regulators.”).
33 E.g., Allen P. Grunes, Another Look at Privacy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1107, 1119
(2013).
34 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE, at x (2014) (“The beneficial uses of near-ubiquitous data collection are large,
and they fuel an increasingly important set of economic activities.”); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 3 (2014) (“Unprece-
dented computational power and sophistication make possible unexpected discoveries,
innovations, and advancements in our quality of life.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF
THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 39 (2015) (“[P]rotecting privacy
and enabling innovation are not mutually exclusive and must consider principles of
accountability and privacy by design.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2014) (“Data brokers provide the information they
compile to clients, who can use it to benefit consumers. . . . [C]onsumers may benefit from
increased and innovative product offerings fueled by increased competition from small
businesses that are able to connect with consumers that they may not have otherwise been
able to reach.”).
35 Laudon, supra note 24, at 97–99.
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agement.”36  If you lack information, you may hire the wrong person, in
which case you expend resources hiring the right one.
In the context of insurance markets, privacy can lead to adverse selec-
tion, whereby unhealthy people consume health insurance at greater
volumes and force insurers to keep raising everyone’s premium.37  Similarly,
unmonitored consumers of car insurance have an incentive to drive more
than they predicted in their application—a so-called moral hazard—leading
again to raised rates for all drivers.38
These and other arguments lead economists interested in law and policy
to counsel against any default toward privacy, if they mention the concept at
all.  Scholars in this tradition tend to conclude that the ability to hide is bad
for market efficiency and hence, ultimately, for consumers.  At a minimum,
they believe virtually all regulation aimed at enforcing consumer privacy
rights will backfire.  “Face it,” Laudon remarks, “[p]rivacy is indeed about
creating and maintaining asymmetries in the distribution of information.”39
II. RESPONSES FROM PRIVACY LAW
Economists are skeptical about privacy.  Responding to this skepticism
animates much of the legal scholarship at the intersection of privacy and
markets.  These responses can be loosely grouped into two categories,
“insider” and “outsider.”  The insider critique accepts the basic premise that
efficiency is the proper lodestar for markets but argues that privacy can also
promote greater efficiency in certain settings or, alternatively, that the mar-
ket could yield privacy under the appropriate circumstances.  The outsider
critique rejects the market paradigm and observes that it is markets’ very
appetite for information that compromises privacy in ways prosaic and
profound.
A. The Insiders
Insiders have no basic problem with markets or the market mechanism.
Or, at any rate, they begin from an assumption that market efficiency is a
valid goal.  What they question is whether privacy is always inefficient, what I
will call the “not always” response, or whether markets could be recalibrated
to foster greater privacy.  I discuss these approaches in turn.
1. The “Not Always” Response
Several responses to economic skepticism about privacy take the form of
pointing out that privacy sometimes yields greater efficiency.  In the privacy
literature, Richard Murphy, Paul Schwartz, and Peter Swire, among others,
36 Id. at 97.
37 Id. at 97–98.
38 Id. at 98.
39 Id.
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pursue this approach.40  “The economic argument is powerful, and disables
much of the lofty rhetoric of privacy rights,” concedes Murphy, “[b]ut it does
not imply that all limits on disclosure of personal information are ineffi-
cient.”41  Sometimes the exogenous preference for privacy outweighs the
benefits of disclosure, and disclosing information about people against their
will can lead them to distort or withdraw information going forward, erasing
the supposed gains to efficiency of lesser privacy.
For Schwartz, “a strong economic argument can be made in favor of
privacy” in the context of health law.42  Schwartz cites the “positive economic
role that data privacy plays in many circumstances,” but his arguments focus
instead on the unintended consequences of adding information to a market-
place full of critical imperfections.43  For example, employers are likely to
make mistakes in discriminating against employees on the basis of genetic
predispositions that are unlikely to ever materialize.44  Swire points to the
role of trade secrets and confidentiality in promoting efficient transactions.45
A small handful of economists have reached similar conclusions about
the role of privacy in promoting efficiency.  In agency theory, work by econo-
mist Jacques Cre´mer, for instance, suggests that better monitoring removes
the ability of the employer to refuse to consider employee excuses, which in
turns reduces productivity and the efficiency of agent selection.46  Benjamin
Hermalin and Michael Katz observe that the protection of privacy can lead to
ex ante efficiencies even if restrictions on information is inefficient ex post;
in insurance markets, for instance, health privacy eliminates socially wasteful
costs of testing each participant’s health.47  And the observation that infor-
mation is necessary to innovation can be met with the claim that consumers
who are too nervous about privacy will not adopt new services or modes of
commerce like the Internet.
In a magisterial literature review of the economics of privacy, which I
cannot recommend enough, Alessandro Acquisti and colleagues review
decades of economic analysis that they group into three “waves.”48  Review-
ing this work, the authors find that “it is not possible to conclude unambigu-
40 See Murphy, supra note 31, at 2385 (defending privacy as efficiency promoting in
some contexts); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Informa-
tion, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (same).
41 Murphy, supra note 31, at 2385–86.
42 Schwartz, supra note 40, at 4.
43 Id. at 22.
44 See id. at 19–22 (“Genetic data that refer to specific individuals provide a new way of
talking about people and making decisions about them.  The value of genetics as a predic-
tive tool is, however, mixed at best.”).
45 Swire, supra note 23, at 289–90.
46 Jacques Cre´mer, Arm’s Length Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECONOMICS 275, 275–76 (1995).
47 Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Privacy, Property Rights and Efficiency: The
Economics of Privacy as Secrecy, 4 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING & ECON. 209 (2006).
48 Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 53 J. ECON. LITERATURE, (forth-
coming 2015) (manuscript at 9).
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ously whether privacy protection entails a net ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ change
in purely economic terms: its impact is context specific.”49
Privacy can lead to economic inefficiency, but not always.50  This insight
highlights, I think, a limitation with the insider critique: the critique does not
tell us much about the deeper relationship between privacy and markets.
The insider critique is more caveat than criticism.  It is an important caveat,
of course, and should give the traditional economist pause.  But even in its
strongest form, the critique at most reveals privacy to be yet another lever of
efficiency that can ratchet either way depending on where and how it is
applied.
2. Markets for Privacy
A variation of the insider critique concedes, again, that market partici-
pants need information but points out inefficiencies in its acquisition and use
by firms.  Laudon notably observes that firms tend to be overzealous in their
collection of personal information and “wasteful and inefficient” in its use.51
Firms thereby impose privacy externalities—in the Pigovian sense—on con-
sumers and society as a whole.52  Being an insider, Laudon looks to harness
the power of the market to improve privacy.  Laudon proposes that the law
protect privacy with a property rule,53 meaning that firms cannot gain access
to an individual’s personal information unless the firm meets her price in a
national information market.54  This would force firms to internalize the
costs of acquiring personal information and help ensure they only do so
where efficient.
49 Id. at 2; see also Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics
of Privacy 3 (WPISP-WPIE Roundtable Background Paper No. 3, 2010) (“Ultimately, the
economic consequences of information sharing for all parties involved . . . can be welfare
enhancing or diminishing.”).
50 A friend once gave me a trick to help manage my lack of knowledge about sports:
no matter what anyone in a sports conversation says—for instance, that so-and-so team has
bad defense or a particular catcher is a great hitter—just respond “not always.”  This will
lead the knowledgeable speaker to rack his own memory and, invariably, come up with an
exception.  “Oh right.  There was that series against the White Sox in 1995 when he struck
out every at bat.”  You somehow get credit for this arcane knowledge and the conversation
can move on.
51 Laudon, supra note 24, at 93.
52 Id. at 98.  The reference is to economist Arthur Pigou. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
53 See Laudon, supra note 24, at 99.  This is opposed to protecting privacy with a liabil-
ity rule, whereby firms gain access to data but sometimes pay court-determined compensa-
tion, or protecting privacy with no rule at all. See JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT
205–22 (2008) (discussing theories of privacy as property); James B. Rule, Toward Strong
Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and Institutions, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 183 (2004) (same).
54 Laudon, supra note 24, at 99.
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Others would police a property rule in personal information with code
instead of law.55  Years ago, computer scientists Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith
Cranor, and collaborators developed a “Platform for Privacy Preferences”
whereby an Internet browser negotiates automatically with websites a user
visits and blocks the collection of certain information if the website’s stated
privacy policies do not meet the consumer’s preferences.56  The idea was to
protect consumers while nudging websites toward better practices.
A proposal from 2014 mixes approaches: popular technology critic Jaron
Lanier sees us each receiving tiny “micropayment[s]” whenever a company
monetizes information about us.57  There is also an interesting if inchoate
argument that the market will deliver privacy without law or code simply
because privacy is a selling point.  Examples include a mobile phone provider
following another’s move toward encrypting traffic by default,58 or a search
company offering greater privacy as way to distinguish itself from the domi-
nant player.59
While it is theoretically possible for these market approaches to work,
they have yet to in practice.  No national information market ever arose.
Intermediary interests in collecting data from and about consumers are too
entrenched.60  Online firms are attached to current business models whereby
consumers tacitly exchange privacy for content or service.  Industry, courts,
regulators, and consumers themselves seem to place too little a premium on
privacy even as they extoll its value.  If and when current trends reach a
breaking point, protecting privacy with a property rule represents an intrigu-
ing option.  But it is not an option with a very promising history.61
55 E.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 229 (2006) (“And it is my view that, with a
technology like [platform for privacy preferences], we could lower transaction costs
enough to make a property rule work.”).
56 Joseph Reagle & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Platform for Privacy Preferences, 42 COMM.
ACM 48 (1999).  This approach was endorsed by no less a figure than Lawrence Lessig as a
positive way in which code is law. LESSIG, supra note 55, at 229.
57 JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 9, 226, 317 (2013).
58 Craig Timberg, Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking
Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2014/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-
police/.
59 The Internet search engine Duck Duck Go bills itself as a privacy friendly competi-
tor. See We Don’t Collect or Share Personal Information, DUCK DUCK GO, https://
duckduckgo.com/privacy (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
60 Cranor’s Platform for Privacy Preferences did not gain traction in part because com-
panies developed processes to bypass the privacy protections.  Lorrie Faith Cranor, P3P is
Dead, Long Live P3P!, THIS THING (Dec. 3, 2012), http://lorrie.cranor.org/blog/2012/12/
03/p3p-is-dead-long-live-p3p/.
61 Jessica Litman puts the matter somewhat starkly: “One of the most facile and legalis-
tic approaches to safeguarding privacy that has been offered to date is the notion that
personal information is a species of property.”  Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Informa-
tion Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (2000) (quoting ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT
ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 211 (1971)).  Litman goes on to dis-
cuss some of the hurdles the approach has encountered. Id.
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B. The Outsiders
The insider critics see privacy as the occasional friend of markets and
markets as a potential tool for achieving privacy in some circumstances.  Most
privacy law scholars, however, are outsiders—displaying, if anything, a
greater skepticism toward markets than economists evince toward privacy.
For these many scholars, only sampled in the pages that follow, the market
mechanism is itself the chief threat to privacy.
There are at least three categories of outsider critiques of markets.  The
first critique reframes the insight that markets need information as an argu-
ment that markets eat privacy.  Markets are set up to extract data and thus
market processes invariably lead to greater data promiscuity and hence less
privacy, an instrumental or intrinsic good.  The second critique argues that
markets encourage us to think of privacy as a commodity.  This is a problem
either because consumers are bad at cost-benefits analysis around their data,
or because privacy is not the sort of thing that should be traded in the first
place.  The third claims that markets or market thinking interferes with
human subjectivity, in part because the market’s emphasis on consumer sur-
veillance restricts self-actualization.
1. Markets Eat Privacy
When I say that markets “eat” privacy I mean to refer to the incentives
markets create for personal information to change hands.  These incentives
affect firms, which relentlessly collect information as they compete with one
another for consumer dollars.62  They also affect consumers, who increas-
ingly must part with their information in order to gain access to goods and
services they desire or need.
Scott Peppet develops the argument, based on the general economic
phenomenon of “unraveling,” that contemporary markets are set up to
require consumers to divulge personal information or experience worse out-
comes by default.63  Thus, for instance, drivers today face increased pressure
to permit their driving habits to be tracked so as to qualify for lower insur-
ance premiums.  Firms attempt to reframe the tactic as discounting rates in
exchange for personal information, but of course they set the default rate to
begin with.  The upshot is that consumers who do not give up information
pay more.64  Peppet is an insider, perhaps, to the extent he leverages a phe-
nomenon that comes from economic literature, but his concerns about the
loss of privacy by unraveling do not concern market efficiency.  They go the
62 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
63 Peppet, supra note 9.  The idea of unraveling is that market participants will assume
the worse about sellers if they do not volunteer information about their products and ser-
vices and chose to transact with sellers who are more transparent.  Peppet applies this idea
to consumers: firms will default to poor terms to consumers who are not willing to reveal
why they deserve better ones. Id. at 1155–56.
64 Id.
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other instrumental values of privacy, which the market’s relentless demand
for information erodes.
2. Privacy Is Not for Sale
Markets also denigrate privacy by encouraging us to think of privacy as a
commodity to be traded.  In theory, you can make a market for anything.65
Perhaps some people are fine with companies or the government knowing
more about them, and they are happy to “pay” for content, security, or ser-
vice with their privacy.66  A considerable literature sees a problem with this
privacy market because of how poor we are at managing our privacy;67 we
undervalue it, and we can be nudged by subtle framing or design into disclos-
ing more information than may be good for us.68  Recent work of social psy-
chologists is highly instructive in this regard.69
Other privacy scholars, such as Anita Allen, question whether privacy
should be tradable at all.  Allen sees privacy as indispensable to society to the
degree that establishing a measure of privacy, even by means of coercion, is
justified on various instrumental and normative grounds.70  Allen does not
doubt that some consumers would willingly and even rationally trade their
privacy for some other resource.  Rather, she casts doubt on the idea that
society should support mechanisms by which to do so.71
3. Markets Interfere with Self-Development
Still others—including this author—worry that firms can and do abuse
the power they hold over consumers by virtue of knowing so much about
them.  Thus, for instance, firms have an incentive to engage in individualized
“market manipulation” whereby each consumer is targeted on the basis of his
or her specific set of biases or approached at a time when he or she is most
vulnerable.72  Alternatively, firms will use what they know to sort consumers
65 Cf. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 1–4
(2012) (giving examples of strange or unfortunate things people are willing to trade).
66 WESTIN, supra note 14, at 7.
67 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880, 1883–88 (2013); see also Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior
in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015) (reviewing literature around context-
dependency of consumer privacy preferences).
68 Calo, supra note 62, at 1013.
69 E.g., Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, 4
SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340 (2013); Leslie K. John et al., Strangers on a Plane:
Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858 (2011).
70 Allen, supra note 10, at 628–29.
71 Id.; see also Bloustein, supra note 10, at 988 (“Use of a photograph for trade pur-
poses turns a man into a commodity and makes him serve the economic needs and interest
of others.”).
72 Calo, supra note 62.
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into high priority targets to cultivate aggressively, or lower priority targets to
discriminate against or ignore.73
Some effects of the market are subtler still. The Right to Privacy, the 1890
article that launched a thousand privacy ships, famously worries about
“recent inventions” such as instantaneous photography that made it possible
to fix images of people without their cooperation or consent.74  It is there-
fore often cast as a work about technology.  But equally important to the
authors were the then-new “business methods” whereby “[g]ossip . . . has
become a trade.”75  A market for gossip does not merely distress those who
are its targets; according to the authors, such a market lowers “social stan-
dards and . . . morality.”76  Data promiscuity of this kind ultimately “belittles
and perverts.”77
The work of Neil Richards explores how for-profit surveillance of intel-
lectual processes such as reading stifles the human imagination.  Richards
acknowledges the utility of a “marketplace of ideas” wherein truth (or truths)
competes with fiction or bias.78  But he sees both privacy and First Amend-
ment theory as impoverished to the extent this theory cannot “speak to the
process by which those competing ideas of truth are generated in the first
place.”79  In this way, the market’s figurative and literal demand for data, and
indeed, government and private surveillance of all kinds, threatens the devel-
oping life of the mind.80  In other work, Paul Schwartz analyzes the impact of
data promiscuity more specifically on civic participation, concluding that,
without privacy, people could not develop the political self.81
Recent writing by Julie Cohen goes perhaps the furthest to interrogate
the role of market forces and market thinking in undermining human sub-
jectivity.  Cohen acknowledges the preceding objections but sees them as lim-
ited in a sense—scholarship in what Cohen calls “the technocratic market-
73 JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING
YOUR IDENTITY 88–110 (2011) (discussing how marketers sort consumers into “targets” or
“wastes”).
74 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890).
75 Id. at 195–96.
76 Id. at 196.
77 Id.
78 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 396 (2008).  The “market-
place of ideas” is of course a reference to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s famous dis-
sent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), where the Justice referred to the
“free trade in ideas.”
79 Richards, supra note 78, at 396; see also NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY
(2015) (furthering his argument that privacy is necessary for the formation of new ideas).
80 See Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 701 (2013) (“In
our data-driven internet economy, there is economic value in information, which provides
incentives to collect, amass, and analyze ever-larger quantities of ever-more granular
data.”); RICHARDS, supra note 79.
81 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999).
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calibration mode.”82  The accounts assume a fully formed, autonomous self
that is harmfully diminished or discriminated against by stronger market par-
ticipants.83  To these objections Cohen adds the “economic justice objection”
and the “capabilities objection” that emanate from somewhere other than
the liberal tradition of the autonomous subject.84  The economic justice
objection, which I see as having close affinities with critical legal studies,
holds that the real object of markets is to aggregate resources to the
wealthy.85  Whatever choices market participants make, the system flows
toward inequality.
The capabilities objection “has to do with breathing room for evolving
subjectivity.”86  The objection posits that “all human beings, whatever their
resources, require a baseline degree of freedom from categorization in order
to flourish as human beings.”87  Cohen draws a direct link between the insti-
tutional investment in categorization and the evolution of capitalism.  She
invokes the concept of “informational capitalism” to describe the practices of
firms that “rely on the flows of information to construct pricing and risk man-
agement templates that maximize their ability to . . . extract surplus from all
consumers,” and notes the production of “surveillant assemblage[s]” to mold
information flows into “circuits that serve the interests of powerful entities,
both private and public.”88
In her 2012 tour de force Configuring the Networked Self, Cohen finally
rejects the “‘science’ of markets” as generally inadequate to the task of
explaining culture.89  She criticizes the role of market thinking in cultivating
a view of the subject as a fully formed, autonomous individual who
approaches the world with a set of exogenous preferences and beliefs.90  She
catalogues the ways markets and other forces close life’s little gaps, stamping
out that “interstitial complexity that leaves room for the play of everyday
practice.”91  To Cohen, the purpose of privacy is to protect subjects from
constraints imposed by both public and private power so that people have the
capacity to discover who they are and to influence the culture in which they
are situated.  I will come back to the capabilities objection below; for now,
suffice it to say the objection is not friendly toward markets.
82 Julie E. Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 241, 245
(2012).
83 Id. at 246.
84 Id.  For an overview of Critical Legal Studies, see BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed.
2012).
85 Cohen, supra note 82, at 246.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Cohen, supra note 7, at 1915–16 (quoting 1 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION
AGE 14–18 (1996); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51
BRIT. J. SOC. 605 (2000)).
89 COHEN, supra note 11, at 9.
90 See id. at 9, 32.
91 Id. at 224.
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III.  PRIVACY AND MARKETS AS INTERDEPENDENT
To sum up the argument so far: economists and adherents tend to be
skeptical of privacy because, on the prevailing view, privacy hides information
from the market that the market needs to function efficiently.  Much other
scholarship at the intersection of privacy and markets can be characterized as
a response of some kind to economic skepticism.  The insiders accept market
efficiency as a guidance mechanism but offer that, under certain conditions,
privacy can correct inefficiencies.  The outsiders reject or criticize markets on
various grounds.
This Part develops a novel account of privacy and markets that positions
the two concepts as fundamentally sympathetic.  To the privacy skeptics, I
argue that markets assume and rely upon privacy.  Although the market
mechanism may continue to operate in a world without privacy (or with
much less of it), the market itself would be unrecognizable.  In this way, pri-
vacy plays a similarly contingent but fundamental role to the market mecha-
nism as, for instance, money.
To the market skeptics, I argue that privacy scholarship has failed to
engage seriously enough with markets as a positive force in its own right.  I
begin with the observation that privacy is best understood as an instrument of
human flourishing, i.e., that a central role of privacy is to provide the space
and distance subjects need to figure out who they are.92  But the developing
self needs more than a degree of removal.  People also need access to physical
and other resources, which markets are seemingly well positioned to provide.
More fundamentally, the alternative ways societies could distribute resources
seem vastly more privacy invasive than markets, at least in theory.
The resulting narrative, while perhaps not a “love story” for the ages,
positions privacy and markets as interdependent and sympathetic.  This new
framework permits us to ask new questions, justify and predict institutional
arrangements, and argue normatively for a great separation between markets
and other spheres of life—the subject of this Article’s next and final Part.
A. Markets Without Privacy
In Part II, I catalogued the responses that law and economics has occa-
sioned among students of privacy.  One response involved the claim that
there exist circumstances in which a market with too little privacy is less effi-
cient than one with more.  To these insiders, law and economics could reply
in a way similar to how rational choice theorists have responded to behavior
economics who claim that people are not always rational.93  The privacy skep-
tics could concede that, under very specific circumstances, privacy can be
92 See supra notes 74–91 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (1998) (“[T]he fact that people are not always rational, even that
some are irrational most or all of the time, is not in itself a challenge to rational-choice
economics.”).
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more efficient.  But the gist of their claim—that privacy is bad for markets in
general—remains in almost full force.
My aim here is to make a deeper point that goes to the heart of the
skepticism rather than its margins.  I do not argue that privacy simply makes
markets more efficient or that markets eat privacy.  Rather, the arguments
that follow go to the feasibility of the market mechanism itself in a world
without privacy.  To paraphrase Charles Fried, my thesis is not that privacy
will help markets work better, but that the market mechanism quietly
assumes and relies upon privacy to work in the first place.94
This is true in several ways.  First, the market mechanism relies upon
privacy to screen out extraneous but distracting information.  Second, no less
than in the social sphere, privacy furnishes the means by which long term
business partners can develop intimacy and guard against the ever present
specter of defection.  And third, privacy helps save the market from its own
ironic tendency to spiral into information asymmetry.
1. The Market Veil
Imagine a farmers’ market somewhere in the United States.  Alice is buy-
ing vegetables and Bob is selling them.  Alice goes from booth to booth try-
ing to find vegetables that meet her standards of quality but also her budget.
The vegetables are all laid out next to their prices and descriptions.  Alice
decides that Bob’s vegetables strike the right balance.  She asks Bob a few
questions about his farm; Bob makes a remark about the weather.  Then
Alice pays Bob’s asking price and takes the vegetables home.
It is easy to see the market mechanism at work in this simple example.
Bob and others offer their goods openly to Alice and others, who decide
based on quality and price what, if anything, to buy.  In other words, they
form a market.
The role of privacy is not so obvious.  In order to see privacy’s role, we
need to remove a number of constraints that promote data chastity over data
promiscuity.  Each of these constraints is important; collectively, they yield
the privacy we are to enjoy in any given situation.  These are: (1) contextual
norms against collecting or sharing information;95 (2) laws that penalize
intrusions;96 and (3) architectural or structural features of the physical or
digital world that pose barriers to discovering personal information.97  Let us
take those constraints away and look at the farmers’ market again.
94 Fried, supra note 4, at 477 (“[M]y thesis that privacy is not just one possible means
among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and
relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust.”).
95 See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2010).
96 There are many dozens of federal and state statutes and regulations that protect
privacy in some way, as well as the common law torts famously codified by William Prosser.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
97 Lawrence Lessig identifies four “modalities of regulation,” which include laws,
norms, markets, and architecture.  Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 661, 662–63 (1998).  An architectural or “structural” protection refers to physical or
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Imagine everyone in our farmers’ market were wearing special glasses
that recognize a buyer or seller’s face and create a bubble above their head
containing more or less everything about them that appears in a database.
Some of this information would be quite useful to market participants.98
Thus, Alice could more easily comparison shop and could verify that Bob has
a license to grow and sell food.  But in a world without privacy, Alice would
find out much more than that.  She would see, for instance, that Bob voted
for a politician Alice hates, that he doubts we landed on the moon, or that on
the weekend he enters (and wins!) erotic cake competitions.
Alice does not need to know these things about Bob to transact with
him, or to accomplish her goal of the best vegetables at the lowest price.  And
yet, the information is likely to affect her decision to purchase vegetables
from Bob.  What Bob finds out about Alice could in turn affect his willingness
to sell to her.  A defining, or at any rate, central feature of the market mecha-
nism is that it matches participants based on quality and price.99  Were all
participants transparent to one another in all aspects of life—in other words,
were there no normative, legal, or architectural constraints in place to pro-
mote privacy—information extraneous to the market could distort it.  Alice
would not necessarily stop looking when she found the farmer with the best
goods at the right price; she would look for who in the farmers’ market
aligned enough with her worldview.
I’ll pause for an obvious objection.  Consumers can and do make deci-
sions based on ideology.  Some will avoid diamonds unless they are “conflict
free,”100 for instance, or only buy coffee that is “fair trade.”101  Some will
even avoid patronizing particular businesses due to their political or religious
inclinations, or, conversely refuse to serve certain populations due to bias
(more on discrimination in Part IV).  In some contexts, such as the decision
to hire someone we will then work alongside, we would want to know more
than attributes such as productivity.  Even the “simple” example of a famers
market embeds a set of social or political commitments.102  In cities, at least,
shoppers and vendors at a farmers’ market have made a choice to frequent
that market over, say, a national grocery chain.
The market tolerates a measure of this behavior, treating ideological
commitments as exogenous preferences like the sweetness of an apple.  Writ
large, however, the unfettered personalization of transactions will balkanize
markets, splintering each market into smaller markets of the like-minded.
other barriers that make it harder to gather, process, or disseminate information. See
Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1606 (2007).
98 See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer
Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 679–80 (2012) (noting how “augmented reality” can help
consumers compare prices and terms as well as assess the reputation of venders).
99 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (defining market mechanism).
100 See, e.g., Philippe Le Billon, Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist
Consumer, 38 ANTIPODE 778 (2006).
101 See, e.g., Patrick De Pelsmacker et al., Do Consumers Care About Ethics? Willingness to
Pay for Fair-Trade Coffee, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 363 (2005).
102 I owe this observation to Elizabeth Porter.
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Confronted with highly salient but market-irrelevant information, many con-
sumers may skew purchases toward the people they can stomach dealing
with, given what they know about them.  The marketplace would shift from a
place where we largely set aside social and cultural value judgments in the
common pursuit of obtaining goods and services, to an ideological and
socially fraught environment where quality and price take a second stage.
Writ very large—that is, following the insight to its logical conclusion—
the market becomes unrecognizable.  The challenge would be to find a pair
of one real farmer and one real shopper in that market that, knowing every-
thing about the other, would still be comfortable transacting about anything.
Privacy theorist Paul Ohm argues that every one of us has a “database of
ruin”—a piece of information somewhere that, were it connected to us and
broadly circulated, the results would be devastating.103  If so, every deal has a
database of ruin as well, in the sense that you would not buy vegetables or
anything else from a person if you knew this one particular thing about them.
Though invisible itself, the primary force that stands in the way of a market
distorted and balkanized by extraneous information is privacy.104
In a way, this is not surprising.  Markets are made of goods and money,
but also of people.  Anthropologist Robert Murphy, in a 1964 paper, dis-
cusses the societal role of “distance techniques,” generally—that is, the set of
practices individuals invoke to maintain adequate social distance and hence,
the social order.105  He notes that “[w]here knowledge of the other is mini-
mal, the actor need know only that he is dealing with the butcher, the baker,
or some other social thing.”106  But where “the sphere of knowledge increases,
the defenses about certain residual private spheres must be correspondingly
strengthened.”107
Murphy uses the example of the veil worn by men of the Tuareg people,
which, according to Murphy, helps the Tuareg occupy multiple roles in soci-
ety (e.g., kin and judge) simultaneously without conflict.108  Contemporary
103 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymiza-
tion, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1748 (2010) (“Almost every person in the developed world can
be linked to at least one fact in a computer database that an adversary could use for black-
mail, discrimination, harassment, or financial or identity theft.  I mean more than mere
embarrassment or inconvenience . . . .”).
104 We can and do use other techniques as well—for instance, we have agents who buy
and sell on our behalf.  Examining all the myriad ways we maintain distance in the market
setting is beyond the scope of this Article.  Dennis Hirsch made this point.
105 Robert F. Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, 66 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1257, 1272
(1964).  Privacy scholars cite Murphy from time to time but seldom for this proposition.
E.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212 &
n.62 (1998) (citing Murphy for the proposition that privacy is not culturally contingent);
Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 498 n.36
(2013) (same).  Schwartz recognizes in passing that privacy is “essential to the maintenance
of both social relationships and the sense of self.” Id.
106 Murphy, supra note 105, at 1259.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1269–71.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl204.txt unknown Seq: 21 29-JAN-16 14:36
2015] privacy  and  markets 669
American society certainly has means of generating social distance.  Think,
for instance, of the Catholic confessional that literally screens the priest from
the penitent.  Or think of professional norms in the workplace.109  People
discuss politics around the water cooler up to a point.  But for myriad roles—
managers, professors, students, nurses—norms against overdisclosure and
other safeguards operate to promote focus on institutional tasks.
My argument here is that the market mechanism itself can be seen as a
distance technique—a veil that permits us to focus on the exchange of goods
and services at a price, though we are simultaneously real people living in a
complex world.  Without it, market participants would constantly confront
that familiarity that famously breeds contempt.  We see the market veil in
norms against asking or offering personal information in a market context
and, as discussed in detail below, laws that separate the market decisions
from political affiliations.  Or, rather, we do not see, but it is still very much
there.
2. Economic Intimacy
The relatively simple example of the farmers’ market exemplifies an
interaction between two parties who have no deep relationship, what the con-
tract theorist Ian Macneil would call discrete transactions.110  Many market
interactions take place between repeat players who develop relationships
over time—so-called relational transactions.111  Here the impulse may be that
privacy is less important because the parties get to know each other and, in
the process, naturally discover market-irrelevant information such as where a
business partner grew up or how she takes her coffee.  Not so.  The mecha-
nism underpinning relational transactions also assumes and relies upon pri-
vacy, if for different reasons: privacy is necessary to develop the economic
intimacy between parties to relational transactions that permitted them to
become more deeply involved.
Imagine two small business owners sitting across a table for the first time.
Acme needs a custom-made part for a unique new product.  Smith Manufac-
turing is in a position to create the part but not without significant upfront
investment.  Each has information that, were it known to the other, would
enhance the other’s bargaining position.  For instance, knowing the exact
cost of starting a new manufacturing process would put Acme in a better
position to evaluate business Smith’s initial offer.  Knowing whether Acme
had any competitors would put Smith in a better negotiating posture.  Each
business takes on a measure of risk: either business might defect by failing to
109 Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 252–55 (1959)
(observing that people have different roles in society that are sometimes at tension).
110 Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 693–95 (1974).
I owe this reference to Woodrow Hartzog.
111 See id.
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renew a contract or breaching if a better deal comes along.112  But if all goes
well, Acme and Smith may renew their contracts and form new ones.
In a world without privacy, where businesses Acme and Smith are com-
pletely transparent to one another, there would be certain advantages with
respect to market efficiency.  Neither business would be able to hide any
information in order to take advantage of the other.  They would know how
to set prices.  Though Acme and Smith might not transact in the first place if
too much extraneous information interferes, assuming they do, perhaps pri-
vacy only gets in the way of the smooth and proper function of the market.
Again, the picture is not so straightforward when it comes to real people
entering into actual relationships.  Charles Fried famously argues that privacy
is a necessary condition to any form of intimacy.113  Fried starts with the well-
worn idea that privacy represents the control we have over information about
ourselves.114  We build interpersonal intimacy through the gradual relin-
quishment of that information with select people and not others.  In Fried’s
words:
To be friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each
other.  But intimacy is the sharing of information about one’s actions,
beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has
the right not to share with anyone.  By conferring this right, privacy creates
the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.115
  If true to begin with, Fried’s insights should also apply in the market: busi-
ness partners such as our Acme and Smith must develop trust like everyone
else.  Note that I mean more than the observation, made and well-defended
elsewhere, that mechanisms such as confidentiality lead to greater efficiency
in some circumstances.116  And of course I understand that many business
transactions occur impersonally and at scale.  My claim is that when people
deal with one another in a business context, they are still just people, and
they still require a mechanism by which to develop trust.117
112 So-called “efficient breach” refers to limiting recovery for a breach of a contract to
expectation damages, i.e., the value not received, as opposed to specific performance, dis-
gorgement, or punitive damages.  For a discussion, see Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432 (1985).  Of course, the
non-breaching business still incurs considerable costs, including litigation (if fees are not
paid by the defendant) and especially the costs of finding another buyer or seller.
113 Fried, supra note 4, at 477; see also Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETH-
ICS 76 (1978) (discussing the role of privacy in physical intimacy).
114 Fried, supra note 4, at 482.
115 Id. at 484.
116 Cf. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007).  For the case that confidentiality increases effi-
ciency in some contexts, see Swire, supra note 23.
117 See also Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law
3–6 (Sept. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2655719 (arguing that modern privacy law is incomplete because it has failed
to account for the importance of trust).
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The currency of economic intimacy may, of course, be different than
that of platonic or romantic intimacy.  The information firms “do[ ] not
share with all”118 may relate to their business plans, capacity to pay, trade
secrets, or intellectual property.  Under U.S. law, even publicly traded com-
panies, which have to make certain disclosures to investors and regulators,
enjoy a set of rights not to share information.119  But the mechanism is analo-
gous.  When prospective businesses come together, it stands to reason that
they will play their cards close to the vest so as to secure the best terms.120
Over time, as ties between them thicken, each party will disclose more and
more about their hopes and capacities.  Along the way, the partners will also
get to know each other as people as well.  This process collectively fosters the
sort of trust needed for long-term relational transactions with high stakes.121
Our skeptical economist has a response here, namely, that privacy is
exactly what allows bad actors to get away with defection or other misbehav-
ior firms worry about.122  With nowhere to hide, market participants would
have nothing to hide, because they would not be able to get away with mis-
treating others.  Acme cannot hide the fact that its owner is quietly talking to
another manufacturer.  But this argument is only superficially attractive.
Market participants can always pretend to be fair in their dealings until the
payoff is large enough.  In a world without privacy, market participants are
like the “machines or animals” that, as Fried observes, require constant moni-
toring to ensure compliance.123  What we want in a business partner is not
just someone who happens to have a clean record, but someone we can
trust.124  Privacy makes that trust possible to generate.
3. The Asymmetry Spiral
Economists meticulously study information asymmetry and its effect on
markets.  The classic work The Market for Lemons, which I mention above,
deals with an asymmetry between what buyers and sellers know about cars
and its effect on the market mechanism.125  Some work suggests that other-
wise efficient transactions may not occur at all in the face of too much infor-
118 Fried, supra note 4, at 484.
119 See generally Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27
(2014); see also Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 27, at 404 (arguing that “the law should
in general accord private business information greater protection than it accords personal
information”).
120 I am aware I am making an empirical, if common sense, claim here; my hope is that
I and others will be able to test this and other assertions empirically in future work. See
infra CONCLUSION.
121 More than this, Daniel Markovits’s theory of contract as collaboration emphasizes
the role of contract formation generally in the installation of community moral and politi-
cal values. See Markovits, supra note 5.
122 See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text.
123 Fried, supra note 4, at 486.
124 See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 117.
125 Akerlof, supra note 26.
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mation asymmetry.126  The basic idea is straightforward enough: if you
suspect the party with whom you are transacting has much more information
than you about your position or the market, you may elect to transact with
someone with less of an information advantage.127  But even at a basic level,
consumers without adequate information cannot protect themselves and
police the market.128
The usual remedy for information asymmetry is to give the less sophisti-
cated party more information—for instance, by requiring firms to disclose
information to potential consumers,129 or otherwise by making information
available.  A growing body of literature suggests this approach does not
work.130  The problem is not just that individuals or smaller firms lack infor-
mation but that they lack the ability of larger firms to process and contextual-
ize that information.  Consumers do not even know the extent of the
asymmetry.
Thus, in practice, today more information means more information asym-
metry.  Consider, by way of example, Vermont’s efforts to nudge consumers
toward generic drugs by forcing doctors to publish their prescription history
on an anonymized basis.131  Maybe some consumers select doctors on the
basis of their preference for less expensive versions of drugs.  But pharmaceu-
tical companies definitely took notice—they used the information to “detail”
physicians with the consequence of more successful marketing of proprietary
drugs.132  Privacy, which can check data promiscuity and hence information
asymmetry, clearly has a role to play.
This last argument has not gone unremarked.  In previous work, I built
out a model of “digital market manipulation,” referring to the prospect that
firms would use what they know about consumers to disadvantage them.133
For example, a company might figure out how to market to people when
126 See, e.g., Hermalin & Katz, supra note 47, at 211 & n.9 (citing The Market for Lemons
for the proposition that “privacy can lead to informational asymmetries that destroy mar-
kets and prevent efficient exchange”).
127 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) makes a related claim in recent
proceedings.  In explaining why it will apply privacy rules to Internet service providers, the
FCC mentions that people who believe their privacy will not be respected will not adopt or
upgrade their service.  Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28
(2015), ¶¶ 53–54 (2015).
128 See generally Calo, supra note 6.
129 Id.; see also Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 6 (discussing the failure of man-
dated disclosure).
130 See, e.g., Acquisti et al., supra note 67 (reviewing literature around context-depen-
dency of consumer privacy preferences); Solove, supra note 67 (same).
131 This effort is the subject of a Supreme Court case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653 (2011), discussed below in Part IV.
132 Id.
133 “Market manipulation,” a term coined by Jon Hanson and Doug Kysar in 1999,
refers to the firm leveraging what it knows of consumer bias in order to extract rent from
the consumer.  Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Prob-
lem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 747 (1999).  “Digital market manipula-
tion” refers to the practice, made possible by data intensive, mediated environments, of
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they are tired or vulnerable, or to change prices in order to charge exactly
the consumer’s reservation price (i.e., the highest price they are willing to
pay), a practice known as dynamic price discrimination.  I speculate that reg-
ulators—who have mostly looked the other way at firm exploitation of con-
sumer cognitive bias, such as placing sugary cereals at eye level for a child or
pricing everything $9.99—will be forced to act when this exploitation is
based on individualized information about each consumer.134
Mathematician Andrew Odlyzko takes the line of thought much further,
arguing that capitalism in general cannot sustain its current information
intensity.135  He notes the rise of “confusology,” i.e., purposefully introduc-
ing uncertainty and confusion into consumer transactions, and refers to the
“Tom Sawyer economy” wherein firms pawn off labor and other costs onto
consumers under the guise of creativity and sharing.  He also draws on stud-
ies showing how consumers react, often very poorly, to the dynamic price
discrimination I describe above.
For Odlyzko, public perception could reach a point of no return, such
that we may abandon capitalism altogether, or at least witness a sea change in
its configuration.  He analogizes to the distortions wrought by railroads in
the nineteenth century: “A large industry, sprouting from a seed sown by
capitalism, posed a threat to the functioning and the moral legitimacy of that
system.  Society reacted by imposing limits on it, and thereby preserved capi-
talism.”  Odlyzko wonders: “Will similar measures be taken to cope with the
threats posed by the privacy-eroding trends?”136
In short, the market mechanism assumes privacy in a few, fundamental
ways.  As in other social contexts, privacy hides salient but irrelevant informa-
tion so that economic participants can focus on market essentials such as
price, quantity, and quality.  Every deal, no less than every person, has a
database of ruin.  Privacy also creates the conditions for market intimacy that
underpin and permit relational transactions between market participants
over time.  Finally, assuming the market mechanism is worth preserving, it is
worth exploring how privacy interacts with information asymmetry that can
be fatal in excess.
altering consumer interactions to make each consumer vulnerable to his or her individual
biases.  Calo, supra note 62.
134 Calo, supra note 62, at 1041–44.
135 Andrew Odlyzko, The End of Privacy and the Seeds of Capitalism’s Destruction (June 2,
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
136 Id.  Danielle Keats Citron makes a related point in her important 2007 work.  She
remarks upon the unsustainability of holding so much sensitive personal information with
so little apparent emphasis on security.  These “cyber-reservoirs” of danger resemble the
dangerous practices and conditions created during the Industrial Revolution such as stor-
ing water for mills, which helped provoke the evolution of tort law toward strict liability.
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn
of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 242–45 (2007).
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B. Privacy Without Markets
The preceding section lays out several key ways in which privacy, far
from undermining markets, supports the market mechanism itself.  In a
world without privacy, markets would look and feel very different, and lose
many of the affordances and benefits we see today.  None of this is to deny
that contemporary market forces can be pernicious to privacy and other val-
ues, only that markets assume and rely upon privacy even as they sometimes
undermine it.  If anything, the role of privacy in markets suggests a role for
law, explored in greater depth in the next Part, in protecting the market
essentially from itself.
It may be tempting to conclude that this Article is not a love story at all
but a story of misadventures in symbiosis.  Markets are parasitic upon privacy,
which gains nothing in return.  The outside critique, which bemoans the
impact of contemporary market forces on privacy and calls for intervention,
implicitly paints such a picture.  And yet, the notion of a parasitic market
misses much.  This position fails to acknowledge, let alone account for, the
role that markets play in safeguarding privacy or promoting privacy’s deepest
goals.
I do not mean safeguarding in the sense of delivering greater privacy
through competition or information markets, as Laudon and others
argue.137  Again, I point to something more fundamental.  I see at least two
ways that privacy assumes and relies upon markets to fulfill its important role
in society.  First, markets help privacy accomplish its deeper goal of support-
ing human flourishing by helping to meet basic needs and connecting peo-
ple to the material and cultural resources they require to self-determine.
Second, and more basically, markets remain the most plausible mechanism
by which to distribute resources that does not necessarily depend on highly
detailed information about individuals.
1. The Cooperative Market
The deepest accounts of the purposes of privacy—what privacy is
“for”138—seem to involve human flourishing.  Whether the goal is demo-
cratic participation,139 self-actualization,140 moral autonomy,141 or some-
thing else, the protections privacy affords are, I agree, crucial.  But if privacy
is a necessary condition for human flourishing, it does not follow that it is a
sufficient condition.  A person rich in privacy but poor in all else is unlikely to
flourish.  This is true for several reasons.  People can have few thoughts of
flourishing or even democratic participation if they chronically lack for basic
necessities.  And, in order to self-actualize, a person must not only be pro-
137 See supra notes 51–59 and accompanying text.
138 Cohen, supra note 7.
139 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 81, at 1648–53.
140 E.g., Gavison, supra note 16, at 423–24.
141 E.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 1907.
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tected from culture in certain ways, she must also have a stable channel by
which to access and influence that culture.
Though very far from ideal, the market mechanism seems like the lead-
ing candidate in Western democracies to meet these additional require-
ments.  It is important to note that markets possess not only a competitive
function that pits people and groups against each other, but what Jules Cole-
man calls a cooperative function.142  Properly calibrated, markets help people
help one another, a proposition too little remarked in the privacy literature.
Accordingly, and assuming the end game is truly flourishing of some kind,
privacy scholarship should arguably devote as much energy to engineering
better markets as it does to critiquing them.
The idea that flourishing requires that basic needs be met probably
strikes the contemporary reader as obvious and trivial, but the notion has a
long and famous lineage.  An interesting building block is Abraham Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs.143  Maslow observes that a person who lacks physiological
necessities such as shelter or food will concentrate all of her energy on pro-
curing them.  Only when these basics are met will she turn her attention to
higher order pursuits—safety, love, and esteem, in that order.144  Self-actuali-
zation—which Maslow defines as the “desire to become more and more what
one is”—sits at the very top of the pyramid, influencing human affairs only
where the lower needs have been met.145  Says Maslow of the person who
lacks food:
Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved
aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach.  Such a
man may fairly be said to live by bread alone.146
  On Maslow’s sweeping account, society and culture constitute “an adaptive
tool, one of whose main functions is to make the physiological emergencies
come less and less often.”147  The freedoms we experience—to speak, to act,
to seek information, to defend ourselves—are in actuality preconditions to
satisfying the basic needs.  As a consequence, some societies react to actions
or policies that compromise these freedoms with a “threat or emergency
response” usually reserved for deprivation of psychological needs.148
142 Jules Coleman, Competition and Cooperation, 98 ETHICS 76, 76 (1987).
143 A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943). A Theory
of Human Motivation is a classic of psychology, with over twelve thousand citations.
144 Id. at 394.
145 Id. at 382.  Maslow acknowledges that there are instances where a certain type of
person will invert the pyramid, as when a martyr for a belief refuses food or a starving artist
creates. Id. at 386–88.
146 Id. at 374.
147 Id.  An interesting thought, suffice it to say that it does not follow from Maslow’s
account that culture is somehow an adaptive tool in furtherance of stability.  For a contem-
porary claim that morality is an adaptive tool in furtherance of cooperation, trust, and
fairness, see the work of moral psychologist Joshua Greene. E.g., JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL
TRIBES (2013).
148 Maslow, supra note 143, at 383.
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Maslow’s is avowedly a theory of human motivation, but it has obvious
affinities to flourishing.  And the notion that people need the basics to flour-
ish is an old one indeed.  In his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle also observes that
virtue is difficult for those who lack certain baseline traits and resources
because, he argues, such people will not have access to opportunities to flour-
ish.149  These accounts take many twists and turns beyond the scope of this
Article.  And likely few would commit to every assumption held or conclusion
advanced by Maslow, Aristotle, or other proponents.  But there is wisdom in
requiring of a strategy to promote human flourishing that it include a plan to
meet basic needs, such that people can experience the world and one
another in a state other than emergency.
Human flourishing is somewhat a function of meeting basic needs.  But
it is clearly much more than that.  Among the more sophisticated and endur-
ing accounts of human flourishing is the capabilities approach.  Most closely
associated with the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, capabilities
refer to a certain kind of opportunity individuals in a society have “to achieve
valuable combinations of human functionings—what a person is able to do
or be.”150  The emphasis is not in possessing technical rights or freedoms on
paper, but in the actual capacity of individuals to navigate lived experience.
Can a real person situated in a given society, even one with disabilities or who
is poor or outside the mainstream, actually move about freely, marry who
they love, or experience the power of music?151
Nussbaum, if not Sen, enumerates a core set of capabilities.152  As with
Maslow and Aristotle, certain of these involve physical security and health or
physical and emotional connection.  Others involve imagination, thought,
and play, which Julie Cohen elevates in her work on information policy.153
These are activities directed more at allowing the subject to self-actualize, i.e.,
become who she really is.  Sen declines to enumerate particular examples of
capabilities on the theory that societies should continually discuss and assess
what they value.154  No less than Nussbaum, however, Sen is committed to
the notion that certain capabilities—such as the ability to meet nutritional
needs or participate in the social life of the community—represent usual
antecedents to flourishing.155
149 Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed. 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/.
150 Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151, 153 (2005).
151 One way to think of capabilities is that they are akin to beneficial societal
affordances, i.e., the set of positive opportunities available to humans by virtue of their
socio-cultural environment. Cf. James J. Gibson, The Theory of Affordances, in PERCEIVING,
ACTING, AND KNOWING (Robert Shaw & John Bransford eds. 1977).
152 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 78–80 (2000).
153 See COHEN, supra note 11, at 223–73.
154 Sen, supra note 150, at 157–58.
155 Id. at 158 (these include nourishment, freedom from disease, the ability to move
around, and the ability to participate in the social life of the community).
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Four observations about this albeit small sampling of influential
accounts of flourishing: First, they each proceed from the assumption that
certain basic needs must be met before a person is in a position to flourish or
self-actualize.  Second, assuming basic needs are met, it would seem the sub-
ject must further come into contact with cultural resources, ideas, and mater-
ials in order to self-constitute.  The capabilities around self-actualization are
not consistent with complete isolation.  People do not become situated sub-
jects within society by walling themselves entirely off.156
Third, privacy has a role to play in each of these accounts.  If security is a
prerequisite, a person who lacks a right to be left alone will not feel secure.  If
love is needed, privacy makes friendship and love possible by fostering inti-
macy.157  Privacy allows for what Westin called our “moments offstage,” as
well as room for intellectual development and imagination generally.158  Pri-
vacy helps in the production of what Cohen calls “semantic discontinuity”
which in turns makes space for the “play of everyday practice.”159
Yet fourth, privacy is obviously only one of many considerations.  Only by
securing a roof over her head, a door she can lock, and three meals a day can
the subject begin to reflect on who she really is.160  Only by encountering
what ideas and artifacts are available in society can the subject determine his
affinities.  And having developed a distinct if always evolving voice, the indi-
vidual must have access to a channel by which to reflect back his subjectivity.
All of this requires mechanisms beyond information theory let alone privacy.
Though data chastity has a role, so does data promiscuity.  Not only must
people have a means by which to withdraw, they must have a means by which
to connect.  People must have two-way access to physical, cultural, social and
other resources.
Can markets deliver these resources?  They can, at least in theory.  In his
1987 essay Competition and Cooperation, legal theorist Jules Coleman develops
a different vision of markets than the one on offer by outsider critics.  He
argues that markets are ironic vehicles of cooperation.161  Ironic because, in
the market paradigm, “the perfectly competitive market is taken as a logical
and normative point of departure for the analysis and justification of
nonmarket, usually legal, political, and moral institutions.”162  Proponents of
the market paradigm justify it on the basis that individual actors acting in
their own best interest—competing, as it were—yields the best outcome for
the most participants.  Society only collects to cooperate legally and politi-
cally when markets fail, in the sense that “individually rational action
156 Cf. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1975) (exploring the
tension between achieving distance and connection).
157 Fried, supra note 4, at 477.
158 WESTIN, supra note 14, at 35.
159 COHEN, supra note 11, at 31.
160 Maslow, supra note 143, at 382–84.
161 Coleman, supra note 142, at 76.
162 Id.
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yields . . . collectively irrational or suboptimal outcome[s].”163  For example,
when markets lack information or discriminate on the basis of race, regula-
tors force disclosure and (hopefully) invoke civil rights law.  Otherwise, free
competition reigns supreme.
Coleman acknowledges the competitive underpinnings of markets but
invites us to see markets as essentially cooperative in several ways.  Taking
them in reverse order, Coleman explores how markets help to foster social
stability in the face of difference.  He observes that broad consensus across a
heterogeneous society is “both rare and fragile,” i.e., both hard to achieve
and hard to maintain.164  “[G]iven that stability depends on mutual agree-
ment,” Coleman observes, it is plausible that “we should prefer institutions
that maximize the domain or scope of social interaction for mutual advan-
tage which do not themselves require broad consensus.”165  In other words, a
free and equal society that has to come together and agree upon such deli-
cate topics as who in society should do what task or get what resource would
not last long.  Markets promote stability insofar as the institution of the mar-
ket “maximizes the opportunities for interaction without at every turn calling
into question the values of others or the legitimacy of the ends they seek.”166
Notice the connection between Coleman’s view of the cooperative mar-
ket and the role of privacy described earlier in the Article.  Though unac-
knowledged by Coleman, privacy is crucial to the capacity of markets to
promote interaction without value-laden conflict.  Without sufficient privacy,
market participants would come together to transact, only to realize the inev-
itable social, political, religious, or other irreconcilable differences that sepa-
rate many in society.  Consensus would be all the more rare and fragile.
In addition to helping to provide stability by avoiding the need for con-
stant value judgment, Coleman observes that markets can be said to help
people help one another: “[B]y interacting with one another in markets, we
provide for one another the opportunity to improve our respective well-
being.  We ‘take advantage’ of one another for our mutual advantage.”167
Although each person is pursuing his or her own interest, they are together
pursuing a collective interest in exchange for mutual benefit.
Coleman finds this the less interesting of the two ways markets are coop-
erative; I find it equally so.  Many human activities, directed at a variety of
important goals, make use of competition as their central mechanism.  Sport
is a clear example (even to someone who does not know much about them).
Technically, sports teams compete with one another, sometimes bitterly, for
points and titles.  Collectively, sport fosters teambuilding, promotes exercise,
and, for the nonparticipant, provides entertainment.168  Sports can go too
163 Id. at 80.
164 Id. at 86.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 84.
168 For a stimulating discussion of the value of sports in society, see generally ROBERT L.
SIMON, FAIR PLAY: SPORTS, VALUES, AND SOCIETY (1993).
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far, and so can markets.  But the line between cooperation and competition
is hardly ever a clear or boring one.
The cooperative function of markets holds lessons for the interrelation
of privacy and flourishing.  As noted, a key reason that markets permit
mutual advantage without recourse to hard questions of valuation, in the
ways Coleman describes, is precisely that privacy helps obscure social-political
tensions that BuyPartisan (the app in the Introduction) surfaces.169  Privacy
hides all of our value judgment from one another except price.
In addition, an impersonal and yet cooperative market represents a pow-
erful vehicle to connect people to the various resources they need to flourish.
Flourishing cannot take place where a person wants for the basics and
requires coming into contact with ideas and other cultural and social
resources.  Ideally, markets result in the most value to the most participants.
Yet regardless, markets seem to be the obvious means by which many individ-
uals can generate value and exchange that value for other necessities.  More-
over, the market mechanism opens a path by which individuals can gain
access to, but also introduce, cultural objects, materials, and ideas into larger
society.  Thus, a person can buy a book or music that helps them discover
who they are.  If they then decide to write a book or song, there is a preexist-
ing mechanism in place—and, importantly, a financial incentive—to dis-
tribute it.
2. Socialist Privacy?
Coleman’s vision of the cooperative market raises the further question
of whether there are viable alternatives.  The market mechanism represents
one means, albeit gravely imperfect in practice, by which to distribute
resources in a society.  It requires a certain kind of information to work effi-
ciently, and seems prone to making greater and greater information
demands.  But interestingly, as Coleman argues, the market mechanism does
not necessarily confront market participants with deep questions of values in
every transaction.
So how does privacy fare in a non-market world?  Imagine for a moment
what it would take to distribute societal resources not through the open
exchange of currency and labor, but according to the famous socialist maxim
“[f]rom each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”170
Absent infinite resources, an official would have to understand what each
person is capable of producing and what she is likely to consume.  I submit
that this is not a privacy friendly mechanism.
For a relatively extreme (but real-life) example, we might look at
China—a country that embraces markets in some contexts but rejects it in
others, including in its allocation of government resources.  Around the
same time Matthew Colbert was developing BuyPartisan in D.C., the Chinese
government was compiling a detailed dossier on each person of its billion
169 See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
170 Marx, supra note 8, at 14.
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and a third population.171  This program—called the Social Credit System—
scrutinizes the social, market, and other behavior of citizens in order to
determine their worthiness to receive various sorts of advantages or resources
from the government.172
Even in our capitalist, democratic society we see great information inten-
sity anywhere where the government gets actively involved in redistribution.
Tax privacy is a bomb waiting to go off.  The Internal Revenue Service—our
anti-market—collects incredibly detailed information about citizens so as so
to guess what to expect from them.173  Those who rely upon the government
to meet their basic needs of food and shelter must surrender privacy almost
entirely; some see privacy as increasingly a luxury good.174
We can imagine, with Yochai Benkler, means other than markets to meet
basic human needs and to bring us into contact with one another or dis-
tribute work and resources.175  I do not mean to whitewash or privilege mar-
kets, or to suggest that they are somehow the very best or fairest way to
organize a society.  But again, I question whether these alternative mecha-
nisms will be privacy friendly, specifically, I submit they will not be, because
they will require knowing quite a bit about everyone else.  It is notable that
Benkler’s Wealth of Networks makes literally no mention of privacy,176 just as
Cohen’s Configuring the Networked Self makes little mention of markets.177
As far as I can tell, no one in the literature is explicitly denying that
markets can play an important role in supporting human flourishing.
Rather, the claims are that market excesses are damaging to privacy and
other values and that market thinking itself obscures an important dimen-
sion of information policy.
Nevertheless, just as economists’ skepticism about privacy obscures pri-
vacy’s important role in the market mechanism, the skepticism privacy schol-
ars tend to show toward markets obscures the considerable role of the market
mechanism in promoting human collaboration and fulfillment.  This very
basic story of how markets support flourishing is mostly missing from the
privacy literature, and perhaps in consequence, also missing from consumer
privacy law and policy.  Indeed, it could well be that means exist to foster
contact and distribute resources that rely neither on markets nor the sorts of
privacy-invasive practices I have described above.178  But that is the whole
point: we need an exploration of alternative means of production and distri-
171 Sara Hsu, China’s New Social Credit System, THE DIPLOMAT (May 10, 2015), http://
thediplomat.com/2015/05/chinas-new-social-credit-system/.
172 Id.
173 Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcom-
ing 2015).
174 Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html?_r=0.
175 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
176 Id. at 508.  The word privacy does not appear in the index.
177 COHEN, supra note 11, at Index.
178 See, for instance, the work of Elli Androulaki, Binh Vo, and Steven Bellovin on
taxable bank accounts that preserve privacy.  Elli Androulaki et al., Privacy-Preserving, Taxa-
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bution as well as their frank comparison to the market mechanism on the
dimension of privacy.
IV.  SO WHAT?
I have argued that law and economics misses the role of privacy in sup-
porting the market mechanism and, further, that privacy scholars have yet to
fully explore the role of markets in promoting privacy and its goals.  I have
also alluded along the way to how a framework that positions privacy and
markets as sympathetic might allow us to pose new and important research
questions.  In this final Part, I expand on the advantages of setting aside a
mutual skepticism about privacy and markets.  These advantages are interre-
lated, even cumulative, and include: explaining or justifying the role of the
FTC; predicting the direction of other institutions involved with markets; sur-
facing the role of privacy in reducing discriminatory market behavior; and
building the normative case for greater separation between the personal and
the market sphere.
A. Justifying Our Privacy Watchdog
Let’s start with a puzzle hiding in plain sight: Why is the FTC—an agency
devoted to open markets and replete with economists—the de facto privacy
authority in the United States?179
The answer is not obvious.  The role of the FTC is to promote a “vibrant
marketplace.”180  Market theory is, once again, famously skeptical of privacy.
Economic orthodoxy holds that market participants need information to
make a variety of decisions such as whom they should hire or what they
should buy or sell.  Privacy hides that information.  Privacy is, at best, just
another exogenous consumer preference, except one that happens to harm
the market when selected.
The FTC often follows conventional market theory, as when it rejects
privacy as an independent basis to block a merger between Internet advertis-
ing giants181 or forces a company to keep a privacy promise it already
ble Bank Accounts, in COMPUTER SECURITY—ESORICS 2010 37 (Dimitris Grtizalis et al. eds.,
2010).
179 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 585–86 (“FTC privacy jurisprudence has
become the broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the
United States . . . .”).
180 See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
(last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
181 See Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FTC File No. 071-1070, at *3 (Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Google/DoubleClick],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googled
c-commstmt.pdf (“We have therefore concluded that privacy considerations, as such, do
not provide a basis to challenge this transaction.”); see also Grunes, supra note 33, at 1112
(discussing various “reasons to doubt that privacy will ever reach the status of price, quality,
or innovation in an antitrust review”).
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made.182  The agency in general protects consumers and competition largely
by ensuring that the market has access to enough accurate information.183
But in recent years, the Commission has developed a broad regulatory toolkit
in a seeming bid to elevate privacy as a substantive value, becoming the de
facto data protection authority of the United States and its chief privacy
ambassador to the outside world.184  Why would that be?
The Commission draws its authority from the FTC Act, which empowers
the agency to pursue “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”185  As the agency’s
name, structure, and authority make clear, the FTC is concerned with trade
in general, not any one substantive preference or value.  For example,
although the FTC sanctions purveyors of weight loss drugs for making unsub-
stantiated claims about their products,186 the FTC does not engage in anti-
obesity campaigns.  And yet, the Commission has done more than any other
government body to address consumer privacy in the United States and is
recognized domestically and abroad as a de facto data protection authority.
Recent or forthcoming work by Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog,
Kenneth Bambauer and Deirdre Mulligan, and Chris Hoofnagle reflects a
growing interest among privacy scholars in the Commission and its role.187
Solove and Hartzog trace the FTC’s interest in privacy back to the mid- to late
1990s.188  These authors describe how the Commission came to address
information practices—initially, by enforcing privacy policies required not by
federal rules but under California law.189  They catalog changes to agency
personnel, including the establishment of a Division of Privacy and Identity
Protection with the Consumer Protection Bureau.  This is groundbreaking
research, but the authors effectively gloss over why a commission dedicated
to free trade would protect against privacy and security violations in the first
instance.190
The FTC’s charge, according to its animating statute, has to do with
ensuring fair competition in commerce.  The FTC has the authority to
182 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 648.
183 Id. at 647; see also About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (referring to its role in promoting “access to accurate
information”).
184 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 585–86.
185 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
186 E.g., Stipulated Final Money Judgment, FTC v. Kevin Wright, 2:14-cv-00258-CW (D.
Utah Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141211hcgstip.
pdf.
187 CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (forthcom-
ing 2016); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12.
188 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 585.
189 Id. at 594 & n.33.
190 Solove and Hartzog note only that enforcing promises companies make in a privacy
policy could help “ensure that people would view privacy policies as meaningful and trust-
worthy.” Id. at 599.
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address anticompetitive behavior through its Bureau of Competition, the
mission of which is to “enforce[ ] the nation’s antitrust laws, which form the
foundation of our free market economy.”191  The Bureau of Competition
takes a macro (broader, systemic) view of the market with an eye toward pro-
tecting its overall health.  To this end, the FTC employs a substantial number
of economists192—economists who, again, tend to be deeply skeptical of pri-
vacy because of its effect on market efficiency.  It should come as no surprise,
then, that the Commission has for instance rejected privacy considerations as
a basis to block a merger between two online advertising giants that collect
different types of data about consumers.193
The FTC has more than antitrust authority: in addition to the Bureau of
Competition, the Commission has a Bureau of Consumer Protection.194
This Bureau takes a micro view, scrutinizing particular economic practices
about which consumers or competitors might complain.  And yet, the focus
remains on the prospect of market failure through inadequate or defective
information.  The FTC addresses, for example, whether advertising is truth-
ful or marketing fair, and whether certain relationships were adequately dis-
closed.195  This is clearly in line with a model whereby more information is
better, and where inadequate or false information skews the market away
from value maximization.  Consumers cannot realize their preferences for
privacy or anything else, they cannot protect themselves and police the mar-
ket, if they cannot believe what companies are telling them.  Moreover, truth-
ful firms cannot compete with other firms that tell lies about the quality or
price of their goods and services.
Said another way, much of the FTC’s energy and competency goes to
making sure there is enough information in the market.  The Commission
interprets its authority to stamp out “deceptive” practices to also encompass
false or misleading statements about privacy, privacy being an exogenous
consumer preference.196  Yet the agency’s role has extended well beyond
enforcing the statements companies make in privacy policies.  The agency
routinely holds workshops and publishes guidance on matters related to pri-
191 Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-competition (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
192 See Bureau of Economics, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-economics (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).  The FTC has an entire Bureau of
Economics with two units of three devoted to supporting the FTC’s antitrust enforcement.
See Bureau of Economics Organization Chart, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-economics/organization-chart (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
193 See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 181 (“We have therefore concluded that pri-
vacy considerations, as such, do not provide a basis to challenge this transaction.”); see also
Grunes, supra note 33, at 1112 (discussing various “reasons to doubt that privacy will ever
reach the status of price, quality, or innovation in an antitrust review”).
194 See Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
195 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 628.
196 Id. at 628–38 (canvasing privacy complaints brought under the FTC’s deception
authority).
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vacy and security of emerging technology in general wherein participants
and the Commission recognize a diverse array of complex privacy values.197
And in its burgeoning role as a de facto privacy regulator, the Commission
has relied more and more on its authority to stamp out not only deception
but “unfairness.”198  For instance, the Commission pursues inadequate secur-
ity around the personal information of consumers even in the absence of a
promise to keep it safe,199 as well as sudden or invasive changes to the use
and collection of information that have been technically disclosed to the
consumer.200
The use of unfairness in the privacy context is particularly interesting:
the FTC Act provides that an unfair practice must cause “substantial” injury
to consumers and cannot be “outweighed by any countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition.”201  Elsewhere, federal law has been deeply skep-
tical of whether the loss of privacy constitutes a compensable injury at all.202
And, again, economic orthodoxy holds that the free flow of information
about consumers and their preferences is a countervailing benefit to some
set of consumers as well the market overall.
So the FTC’s expansive interest in consumer privacy remains something
of puzzle.  One way to explain and perhaps justify this focus is to think of
privacy as necessary to the function of the market mechanism.  On a theory
that sees markets and privacy as sympathetic, more information can be bet-
ter, but excess data promiscuity undermines the very enterprise of free trade
that it is the FTC’s stated mission to protect.  Thus, the FTC’s attempts to
domesticate the problem of privacy in the United States can be understood
as a kind of immune response to the direction market economics is taking in
the digital age.  The FTC tries to carve a space for privacy on the tacit
assumption that privacy is necessary for markets to work.
Similarly, the fact that the FTC’s mandate and history is bound up in
commerce and in the smooth functioning of free markets is no impediment
to its interest in human flourishing that promoting privacy affords.  At its
best, the market mechanism helps people help themselves and one another.
The market is, among other things, a way to bring the most people into the
197 See supra note 34 (listing examples).  Randall Picker is developing an argument that
the FTC’s “guidance” is precatory in name only; companies, especially smaller ones, are
likely to construe FTC guidance as essentially rules that must be followed.  Randal C.
Picker, Unjustified By Design: Unfairness and the FTC’s Regulation of Privacy and Data
Security (2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/
files/PickerGMUDraft.pdf.
198 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 638–43 (canvassing privacy complaints brought
under the FTC’s unfairness authority).
199 See, e.g., id. at 643.
200 See, e.g., id. at 634 (discussing In re Sears Holding Management Corp., in which the
Sears company allegedly installed tracking software on computers without adequately call-
ing consumers’ attention to it).
201 See In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, app. at 1070, 1073 (1984) (FTC Policy
Statement on Unfairness).
202 See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011).
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greatest contact with a diversity of social, cultural, and materials from which
to self-actualize.  This is why the market, as well as privacy, is worth protecting
in the first place.
If the theory holds—the theory being that the proper intellectual under-
pinning of the FTC’s growing interest in information privacy relates to the
sympathy between privacy and markets—then at least one testable prediction
follows.  In the wake of the most recent financial crisis, Congress passed a law
requiring, among other things, the establishment of a new agency dedicated
to protecting consumers in the specific context of financial products and ser-
vices203—an area from which federal law arguably withdraws FTC author-
ity.204  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) sets and enforces
rules around, for instance, truth in lending.  Since its establishment in 2011,
the CFPB has brought a few dozen enforcement actions related to misleading
consumers about a financial product or else permitting kickbacks or referral
fees.205  None relate specifically to privacy.  The theory elaborated above
would predict that the CFPB will undergo a similar transformation to the
FTC and show increasing interest in general consumer privacy over time, as
it, too, comes to appreciate the deep role of privacy in the market.
B. Markets and Discrimination
One of the areas the CFPB pursues actively even today is discrimination,
particularly in lending decisions.206  Discrimination famously creates its own
“puzzle” for economists because, some assume, discrimination should not
survive in the face of robust competition.207  And yet, discrimination in the
market persists (likely in proportion to societal bias).  Presumably students of
markets find this not only puzzling but also disturbing.  A framework that
recognizes an important role for privacy in markets also offers privacy as a
lever for combatting existing discrimination.  Privacy can stem the prospect
of more categories of discrimination as access to granular information about
market participants triggers idiosyncratic bias that law or policy has yet to
address.
Sometimes more information can mean less bias.  Lior Strahilevitz nota-
bly argues that additional information, even if privacy invasive, can help com-
203 See Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012).
204 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (granting the CFPB exclusive authority); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(2) (2012) (exempting banks, savings and loan institutions, and Federal credit
unions from FTC authority).
205 See Enforcement, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
blog/category/enforcement/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
206 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ENFORCING CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS (2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201507_cfpb_enforcing-consumer-protection-laws.pdf
(“The CFPB has taken action to help consumers harmed by discriminatory mortgage lend-
ing practices.”).
207 See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Econom-
ics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995).
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bat negative stereotypes.208  Thus, for example, revealing the criminal
background of every job applicant helps conviction-free black men to gain
employment by overriding a biased heuristic.209
But very often more information simply means more bias.  Being a black
man is not something an applicant can generally hide, at least at the inter-
view stage.  Thus, introducing additional information here represents an
imperfect means by which to try to combat the bias that can unfortunately
attach to this applicant profile.  Where, as often, the subject of bias could or
would be hidden from the decisionmaker with sufficient privacy, privacy
becomes a way to help keep bias out of the marketplace in the first place.
One example is genetics.  Some genetic traits are visible, but very many
are not.  Yet invisible traits such as a propensity for mental health problems
could lead to discrimination in insurance, employment, and other settings.
Privacy removes information, including some bases for discrimination, and so
operates as a lever in discrimination policy generally.  Because genetic infor-
mation has become more commonplace, Radhika Roa argues in favor of a
“veil of genetic ignorance” to support equality in several settings.210
There may be ways to hide information long enough to overcome bias,
especially where the bias is not conscious and overtly intended.  Some orches-
tras helped to combat a pattern of sexism in hiring by conducting auditions
behind a screen.  This has reportedly led to many more women orchestral
musicians and, importantly, to a more competitive market for musicians over-
all.  Such techniques should be extended.  To combat apparent bias against
African American names on resumes, for instance, we could adopt blind
screening of online applicants.211
Race, gender, sexual orientation, and genetics are qualities about which
there is general consensus not to discriminate.  We have equal protection
laws, as well as a specific federal law prohibiting discrimination against
employees or applications on the basis of their genetics.  Presumably, how-
ever, people have idiosyncratic biases as well.  Some of these might not end
up affecting market choices, let alone necessitating legislation, because pri-
vacy hides the relevant traits.212
208 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364
(2008).
209 Id. at 366.
210 Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic Ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy to Ensure Equality, 51
VILL. L. REV. 827 (2006).
211 For a well-known study on the effect of names on labor discrimination, see Mari-
anne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9873, 2003).  Of course, nameless job applications, at most, get the
applicant to an interview stage with greater frequency.
212 This observation sets aside, perhaps problematically, whether it is always better to
name and confront discrimination instead of hiding it.  The argument is limited to the role
of discrimination in the marketplace, which is, and could be further, diminished by
privacy.
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C. Enforcing the Veil
In Part III, I argue that, as a descriptive matter, privacy hides informa-
tion from the market that would distort and undermine the market mecha-
nism.  In this section, I push the insight further: I argue that, normatively
speaking, the law can and should take opportunities to limit how much per-
sonal, social, and political information enters the marketplace.  The benefit
accrues to privacy and markets both.
All fifty states explicitly permit public access to voter registration
databases in some form.213  Of these, at least twenty-eight states prohibit the
use of information contained within these databases for any commercial pur-
pose.214  Federal election rules around access to disclosures by individual or
political committee contributors also prohibit using or sharing this informa-
tion for commercial purposes.215
As with the FTC’s interest in privacy, it is a little hard to point to a partic-
ular reason why state and federal law sometimes disallows commercial uses of
political information.  Databases of voters, and particularly of donations,
seem important for democratic transparency.  But there is little by way of
legislative or regulatory record discussing what lawmakers or regulators were
thinking when they included the rule against commercial use.  State voter
database statutes date back to a time before states routinely archived legisla-
tive sessions.216  The Federal Register makes no mention of why the Federal
Election Commission adopted a rule against commercial use, and the rules
did not appear to go through a proposed regulation stage.217  And law review
articles—even those concerning the consumer privacy implications of politi-
cal data—do not necessarily identify the motivations of the states that restrict
political data to noncommercial use.218
We can imagine a number of reasons why decades-old state and federal
rules would prohibit the use of political information to solicit voters commer-
cially.  In particular, regulators could fear diminished participation in politics
if voters were to grow concerned about receiving direct mail to the address
they list on the voter rolls.  Yet there exist, and have long existed, numerous
213 Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861, 868.
214 Id.
215 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2012); see also Sale or Use Restrictions, 11 C.F.R. 104.15
(2015) (providing a sales and use restriction on information contained in required disclo-
sures by political committees).
216 A research librarian at the University of Washington Gallagher library went so far as
to contact the state legislature in Olympia only to be told that the state archives do not
contain legislative history for the time when the state voter data base laws were enacted.
217 See Amendments to Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 45 Fed. Reg. 15080
(Mar. 7, 1980).
218 E.g., Rebecca Green, Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 367,
384 n.120 (2013) (noting that twenty-nine states ban commercial use, but not explaining
why they do so); Deborah G. Johnson et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency,
19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 965 (2011) (noting that “[m]ore than half of the states
prohibit the commercial use of voter registration records” but not explaining why they do
so); Rubinstein, supra note 213, at 868.
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sources of home address and other information that do not condition access
on non-commercial purposes.219  As several scholars observe, the foundation
for the data broker industry is public information of various kinds.220  Data
brokers start with citizens and end up with consumers.  Alternatively, there
may be something specifically unsavory about mixing politics and consump-
tion.  Other scholars catalog the disturbing consequences of, and prohibi-
tions around, thinking of politics like a marketplace.221
A theory that sees privacy and markets as sympathetic not only explains
these laws, it helps to justify and recommend them: making political informa-
tion too easily accessible to the marketplace may undermine the market
mechanism itself.  A highly motivated individual could use political data
today to screen out potential buyers or sellers based on their political beliefs
by, for instance, only offering goods and services to registered Republicans.
In a privacy-free world where all known information appears in a bubble over
your head, it would be trivially easy, perhaps unavoidable, to do so.  But today
a number of legal, normative, and structural impediments stand in the way.
Depending on how one interprets the language of the statute, screening
out buyers or sellers on the basis of political affiliation—even BuyPartisan
itself—could be seen as a commercial use and hence violate particular laws.
Regardless, these laws possess a signaling function, helping to reinforce a
norm against making market decisions with political data.222  Structurally
speaking, the absence of an economic motivation (because commercial use is
prohibited) means fewer individuals and firms will bother to access the data
or make it available to others.223  Maintaining a conceptual and practical sep-
aration between the civic and commercial sphere represents an important
and ultimately market-preserving function where government can help play a
role.
We can imagine and encourage further efforts at separation.  For exam-
ple, municipal and other governments are opening up more and more of
their data to the public.224  Concerned with present trends, these cities can
219 For example, I have yet to come across restrictions around information on who
owns a house or what they paid for it; arrest records (unless sealed); marriage licenses;
hunting licenses; business licenses; or death records.
220 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1,
16–17 (2008); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships
in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 917–18 (2008).
221 See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2000); Helen Nissen-
baum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004).  Rubinstein sees market
principles as ill-suited to politics and notes the illegality of purchasing or selling votes.
Rubinstein, supra note 213, at 904 n.241 (“Not only are marketplace norms different from
voting norms, in the U.S., vote buying is illegal in federal elections and in all fifty states.”).
222 See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harass-
ment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2009) (“Because law is expressive, it constructs our
understanding of harms that are not trivial.”).
223 See Hasen, supra note 221, at 1358.
224 See Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in
Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
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and should consider conditioning access to more categories of citizen infor-
mation, beyond political activity of allegiance, on non-commercial use
only.225  Governments release data for good reasons, accountability foremost
among them.  That “We the People” cede daily governance to officials does
not mean we give up the power to know how we are being governed.226  But
by making the government more transparent, we make ourselves more trans-
parent as well.  Taken to the extreme, and assuming widespread commercial
access, this transparency could distort the market mechanism itself and ham-
per its role in distributing the resources of human flourishing.
Readers familiar with recent First Amendment jurisprudence may won-
der whether a strategy that restricts use to non-commercial purposes will pass
constitutional muster.  Below, I discuss the case of Vermont trying to incen-
tivize doctors to prescribe generics by forcing transparency.  The move
backfired as pharmaceutical companies used the same information to better
target proprietary drugs.  Vermont then sought to ban the use of prescription
history for marketing, and ran right into a First Amendment challenge.
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by the
state of Vermont—the birthplace of the commercial speech doctrine—to
restrict how pharmaceutical companies use the prescription history the state
requires doctors to make publicly available.227  The state hoped doctors
under the watchful eye of the public would prescribe more generic drugs and
fewer expensive brand names.  Instead, the pharmaceutical companies used
the information to target doctors for marketing—a process called “detail-
ing.”228  The Court found an attempt by the state to pursue this targeting to
be an unconstitutional restriction on the speech rights of the companies.
We might worry that other efforts to keep salient, value-laden informa-
tion out of the marketplace would meet a similar fate.  The key difference is
that Vermont did not merely condition release of prescription information
on using it for a non-commercial purpose.  The state singled out particular
speakers to silence.  According to the Court, “Vermont’s law enacts content-
and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-
identifying information.”229  Specifically, “the statute disfavors specific speak-
ers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”230  Thus, the law runs afoul of
constitutional prescriptions of discriminating against viewpoints.  Had the
state instead kept the data itself and released it only on the condition that it
is not used for commercial purposes, the Court might not have taken issue.
225 Id.
226 The preamble of Washington’s public records act is particularly poignant: “The peo-
ple of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them.  The people,
in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good
for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on
remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have
created.”  Wash Rev. Code § 42.56.030 (2015).
227 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
228 Id. at 2659.
229 Id. at 2663.
230 Id.
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Starving the market of all information would be deeply unwise.  The
economists are certainly correct to suggest that market participants need
information to make rational and efficient choices.  But placing limits on the
kinds of information to which market participants have access may be a nec-
essary condition to supporting a market-based sphere at all.  Which, from the
perspective of privacy, may be the best way to distribute physical and cultural
resources in society.
CONCLUSION
In romantic comedies, two people with nothing in common wind up
falling deeply in love.  We should not hold our breath waiting on this fate for
law and economics and privacy law scholars.  Nevertheless, a sustained exami-
nation of privacy and markets reveals the important ways in which the two
concepts are sympathetic.  Markets assume and rely upon privacy to prevent a
deluge of extraneous information, to encourage deeper economic partner-
ships, and to keep information asymmetry in check.  A world without mar-
kets, meanwhile, is not a privacy-friendly one.  The market mechanism
represents a relatively anonymous means by which to distribute resources in
society.  And markets, no less than privacy, have a role in human flourishing.
Hollywood had it right: these opposites do attract.
This Article operates mostly at the level of theory.  Several of the claims
can and should be subject to empirical assessment.231  We might test, for
instance, whether market participants tend to balkanize in the face of salient
but market-irrelevant traits and beliefs.  We can also model whether parties
entering into relational transactions with ex ante complete information
behavior defect more often than those who come to better information in
time.  My hypothesis would be that where all information were disclosed
upfront in a prospectus to subjects in game, we would see higher rates of
defection than in a condition where the participants revealed their capabili-
ties and preferences to select partners over time.  This process may—or may
not—generate an economic intimacy that reduces defection.  Either way, it
would be very interesting to know.
Ultimately my hope for this Article is to clear the way for these and simi-
lar questions at the intersection of privacy and markets.  Although there is an
existing literature burgeoning around the “economics of privacy,” the
domain of inquiry remains somewhat limited.  Deep questions as to the com-
plex relationship between these two important societal forces remain
unasked, let alone answered.  This Article has tried to pose some of the ques-
tions here.  I suspect that if economists and privacy scholars could set aside
their common skepticism they might find love, or at the very least knowledge.
231 A worthwhile project would test canonical pronouncements about the instrumental
value of privacy empirically, as other disciplines have done.  It is all well and good for Fried
to say, in the nineteen seventies, that love and friendship require privacy.  We now enjoy a
more mature discipline with access to qualitative and quantitative methods.
